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Europcar rental locations in France. Same smart app. More mobility. Download the Europcar mobile app for iPhone, iPad and Android now! Europcar Worldwide. Abu Dhabi. Czech Republic. If an employer can insist that earned paid leave run concurrently with the twelve week FMLA mandated leave of absence, it can certainly insist that an unearned paid leave of absence can be treated in the same manner, with or without prior notification.

Moreover, even if plaintiff were correct that her FMLA leave only began on February 19th, [23] the date that she undisputedly received defendant's February 2nd letter requesting her to fill out FMLA request forms, she could have received only twelve weeks of further leave under the FMLA from that point.

Counting twelve weeks from February 19th, plaintiff should have returned to work at the latest, on May 14, Accordingly, even under plaintiff's theory, she remained on leave longer than the twelve week period allowed her by statute and therefore Morehouse was entitled to terminate her. In summary, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's FMLA leave began on December 7, , the date of the birth of her child, and ended on March 1, Even accepting plaintiff's argument that her FMLA leave began on February 19, , however, such leave would have expired on May 14, As plaintiff never returned to work at all and as the defendant did not fire plaintiff until May 17, , plaintiff has no basis for a claim that the defendant violated the FMLA by terminating her for leave in excess of the twelve week period allowed by that statute.

Plaintiff's alternative argument that Gaffney ratified her return to work date following her FMLA leave is based on an assumption that a supervisor can unilaterally change the employer's obligations to an employee under the FMLA. Plaintiff argues that Gaffney voluntarily extended her rights "under the FMLA" to give her an additional twelve weeks of leave in addition to the eleven weeks she was given from December 7, to February 19, Defendant responds that, even accepting for purposes of summary judgment that Gaffney did make such a promise, a supervisor does not have the ability to extend the FMLA protection afforded to an employee under federal law, and thereby subject the employer to federal liability under the FMLA, if the provisions of the statute do not so provide.

The Court agrees with Morehouse. Gaffney did not have the authority to extend the FMLA protection afforded Johnson under federal law and thereby to subject Morehouse to federal liability in the process. By holding plaintiff's job for her for more than five months, defendant gave plaintiff almost twice the amount of leave that was required of it under the FMLA. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in McGregor, "the statute does not suggest that the twelve week entitlement may be extended," even though an employer may certainly adopt or retain leave policies that afford more leave than the minimum leave mandated by the FMLA.

McGregor, F. See also Ragsdale, F. Moreover, as noted supra, even if Gaffney had made a promise to start plaintiff's FMLA leave on February 19th, she still remained away from her job for more than twelve weeks. Accordingly, for all the above reasons, the Court grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's claim that Morehouse interfered with her FMLA statutory rights. Plaintiff has also asserted a retaliation claim.

Unlike an interference claim, a plaintiff who asserts a retaliation claim must prove that the employer acted with the requisite intent to retaliate. See Cross v. Southwest Recreational Indus. Mervyns, Inc. Total Sys. Camden County Bd. Morehouse does not dispute that Johnson has satisfied the first two elements of the prima facie case. Johnson did engage in protected conduct by taking FMLA leave after the birth of her child, and she also suffered the adverse employment action of being discharged.

The dispute boils down to the legal question whether, on the undisputed facts in this case, plaintiff has set out a claim of retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that Morehouse "retaliated against [her] by failing to return her to the same position that she held when [her FMLA] leave commenced.

Under plaintiff's version of the facts, Morehouse informed her that she had been terminated at the end of her FMLA leave because she had been out so long and it was "unfair to other staff members of that office to have a slot that was not functional.

Further, plaintiff claims that Gaffney informed her that if she "dropped her FMLA claim," she could have her job back. Plaintiff contends that, taking all factual inferences in her favor, these facts alone establish that Morehouse fired her in retaliation for her use of FMLA leave.

Morehouse responds that plaintiff's argument is illogical and inconsistent. Morehouse notes that if Gaffney truly had offered to extend Johnson's leave until February 19, , it would be inconsistent of him to terminate her on the last day of the voluntarily given extension of time.

Further, in combination with the fact that Gaffney believed he had forwarded her sick leave, which he states he "wouldn't have advanced her" if he was expecting her not to come back, it is very unlikely that Gaffney harbored any ill will against plaintiff resulting in a retaliatory firing for her exercise of FMLA rights. Rather, Morehouse continues, it was Johnson's consistent failure to communicate with Morehouse regarding a request for additional leave without pay and failure to inform Morehouse of an intended return to work date, that ultimately left Morehouse with no alternative but to dismiss Johnson.

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Finally, the statute makes it unlawful to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual because such person has filed any charge under the subchapter. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Brungart, the FMLA nowhere uses the term "retaliation," although the statute does appear to contemplate retaliatory action.

According to Brungart, a prohibition of retaliation is implicit in the statute to the extent that "an employer may not do bad things to an employee who has exercised or attempted to exercise any rights under the statute. Examined against the above statutory language, plaintiff's retaliation claim appears to be little more than a rehash of her substantive FMLA claim.

In essence, she argues that defendant was not permitted to fire her as a result of her refusal to return to her job because this refusal was warranted by the FMLA. But that is just another way of saying that the FMLA permitted plaintiff to remain off the job for over five months after the birth of her child: an argument that this Court has roundly rejected in the preceding discussion.

Obviously, as long as the employee has been given the requisite leave period under the FMLA, the FMLA does not forbid an employer from firing an employee who simply refuses to come back to work, as did this plaintiff. Thus, by firing plaintiff, defendant did not discharge her for opposing any practice made unlawful by the FMLA.

See 29 U. Indeed, it is clear to this Court that plaintiff's type of claim is one that is not covered by any prohibition against retaliation in the statute. There, the plaintiff had requested, in advance, three weeks of FMLA leave in order that plaintiff Brungart could have knee surgery; the leave was proper under the FMLA and was approved by plaintiff's immediate supervisor.

Prior to the date in which the plaintiff was to begin her leave, however, the defendant employer terminated her, allegedly for serious work performance deficiencies. Brungart, F. Plaintiff Brungart contended that her dismissal was actually in retaliation for her anticipated use of FMLA leave. Brungart presents the typical FMLA retaliation scenario in which an employer sanctions an employee, either after the latter has been granted permission for FMLA leave in the future or has returned to work following the completion of the FMLA leave.

Neither of these scenarios occurred here. She was given her full twelve weeks and more. In short, in a dispute concerning the amount of an FMLA leave that an employee can take, an employer who has fired an employee for exceeding her FMLA leave, and who later turns out to be wrong in his calculations, may be held liable on an interference claim for denying the exercise of a right provided by the FMLA, pursuant to 29 U.

The employer's liability, however, depends totally on whether he calculated correctly the FMLA leave to which the employee was entitled. Such an employer is not subject to the "retaliation" prohibitions of the statute by virtue of his miscalculation, alone.

Plaintiff also avers that Gaffney and Rawles informed her that she could have her job back if she dropped her FMLA claim. Plaintiff's statutorily protected conduct was her use of twelve weeks of leave following the birth of her child.

Clearly, as plaintiff's FMLA leave expired on March 7th and she was not fired for over two more months, there is no causal connection between her "protected conduct" and her termination. Indeed, as noted, plaintiff did not even return to work in the appropriate period of time under her own theory of how the FMLA operated.

In short, an employee's insistence on taking more leave than is allowed by the FMLA is not protected conduct. As to Rawles and Gaffney's alleged offer to give plaintiff her job back, if she would drop her FMLA claim, the statute makes it unlawful to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual because such person has filed any charge under the subchapter.

As plaintiff had already been terminated when this conversation allegedly occurred, defendant's discharge of her necessarily could not have been because of her subsequent decision to file this litigation. Nor does Rawles and Gaffney's purported offer to reinstate plaintiff if she dropped her litigation constitute discrimination because plaintiff had opposed an "unlawful practice.

Indeed, Rawles and Gaffney's offer, if made, seems to be entirely consistent with the generous and solicitous attitude that defendant took toward plaintiff throughout her long period of leave. This section provides that "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection a if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

As the Supreme Court has observed, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendant state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.

Cohill, U. See also Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ. The Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate in this case because plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed. Moreover, "[n]eedless decision of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surerfooted reading of applicable law. Gibbs, U. For example, plaintiff's method of disputing Defendant's Statement of Facts at paragraphs 59, , 69, 71, , is to unilaterally proclaim that Cynthia Rawles, the Associate Director of Human Resources, did not consider plaintiff's administrative leave or plaintiff and Gaffney's alleged agreement as to when her FMLA leave commenced.

Such an answer to all 14 statements is inappropriate and unresponsive, since many of the statements detail statements individuals made or actions people did.

The fact that plaintiff seeks to deny such events occurred because she disagrees with the assumption upon which the individuals may have been operating, namely the date when her FMLA leave began, is not sufficient to deny the substance of the factual statements. Where the Court can discern that Johnson is actually disputing the occurrence of a stated fact, it gives her the benefit of the doubt. But otherwise, as LR As to annual leave, a full-time employee accrues 1.

Upon learning that Moses had made Johnson a promotion offer, Gaffney informed Moses that he did not have the authority to make such an offer and that there was no money available for such a promotion.

The position of Service Learning Coordinator was never created nor approved by Gaffney. It is not clear from the record, however, if either Gaffney or Moses ever informed Johnson that she would not receive the promotion.

Johnson admits she was unable to perform her job duties of answering the telephone, filing, and distributing the mail while she worked from home, and as a result, she delegated these job duties, along with other tasks, to student assistants who were employed in the Office of Community Services. Johnson claims, however, not to have received either letter, thus necessitating the hand delivery of the February 2 letter. We want to congratulate you and Glen on the birth of your daughter.

The administrative leave that was initiated by Dr. John Stansfield has been cleared for your return. However, since the birth of your daughter, we will transfer you to family medical leave.

In order for us to give you the appropriate time for family medical leave, please fill out the enclosed forms and return it to human resources. See Letter dated February 2, attached as Ex.

If an employee fails to return from FMLA leave after the period of leave to which the employee is entitled has expired, the employer may recover the premium that the employer paid for maintaining the health care coverage of the employee. Notwithstanding its right to recoup this money, Morehouse never requested that Johnson reimburse it for the medical insurance premiums it paid on her behalf. Celotex, U. See Answer of Morehouse College [5].

Plaintiff had been employed for at least twelve months by Morehouse and for at least 1, hours of service during the previous twelve month period, qualifying her for leave under the FMLA.

See id. Moreover, Morehouse paid plaintiff and did not require her to use any accrued leave for the period of time between the end of the administrative leave period and the birth of her child. As noted infra, however, even granting plaintiff her questionable assumption that her FMLA leave began on February 19th, Morehouse nonetheless gave her an additional eleven weeks off before finally having to terminate her for her refusal to come back to work.

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