Is it possible to win nuclear war

There is an unhealthy parallel between today's military plans and those which catapulted Europe into World War I.

Each time the far-flung military forces of the two great powers go on alert, the trigger is pulled in nuclear roulette. Every day, there is a small chance that failures in high technology military equipment will start an accidental nuclear war. Every computer error, every false alert, every test missile that goes off course, pulls the trigger. Every day, there is a small chance that a governmental or military group high up in either nation will succumb to group dynamics to such a degree that individual judgment will be lost and rash decisions made.

Each time a team is called upon to decide how to respond to a provocative incident, each time warriors gather to decide what steps to take, the trigger is pulled. But taken together over a year's time, they add up to a cumulative probability which is no longer small Taken together over a century, they make nuclear war virtually inevitable.

Each of the hundreds of thousands of people with responsibility for nuclear weapons who drinks or uses drugs adds a small increment to the chance for nuclear war. Each time a custodian of nuclear materials, or nuclear plans, or keys to a nuclear facility, uses alcohol or other drugs, the trigger is pulled. Every day, there is a small chance that terrorists or renegade governments will construct a nuclear weapon. The know-how, the materials, and the places where such construction can occur are scattered all over the globe.

Fissionable material suitable for use in weapons is produced as an unwanted by-product at every civilian nuclear power plant in the world. More than , nuclear weapons could be built from the world's current nuclear wastes. Every coffee cup of fissionable material that a terrorist might obtain pulls the trigger in nuclear roulette.

Each of these probabilities, by itself, is small. But taken together over a year's time, they add up to a cumulative probability which is no longer small. Taken together over a decade, the probability is significant.

We cannot continue on our present course forever. Freezing nuclear arsenals at their current levels would help, but would not change the inevitability. Nor would cutting the number of nuclear weapons in half from 50, to 25, Twenty-five thousand nuclear weapons is still 25, potential accidents, each far more destructive than Chernobyl. Even eliminating all existing nuclear weapons would not alter the logic. We will always know how to build new ones and, during war, there would be tremendous pressure to do so.

So what can we do? What is enough? The only thing that will work is to address each of the small probabilities that together add up to inevitability. We have to change the thinking that drives us to stockpile tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, place them in depots that are increasingly vulnerable to terrorist attack, and guard them with people subject to the influence of alcohol or other drugs.

We can no longer allow the survival of civilization to be dependent on the error-free operation of high technology defense systems - or on the rational functioning of sometimes irrational human beings. We have to stop threatening military force. We have to stop engaging in small wars. While we must change each of these, there is a common source. Robert Powell , a Berkeley political scientist who has written extensively on game theory and war, teaches his students a different model of nuclear brinkmanship than the one we played.

The Nature player is introduced into games as a sort of random number generator. It effectively flips a coin to decide its path — and when the other two actors are close enough to war, sometimes Nature nudges them toward — or over — the edge. Take, for instance, a routine Air Force patrol flight that went wrong during the height of the Cold War that nearly devastated the U.

Such could have been the cost of the standoff with the Soviets. If the White House is vocal about its willingness to consider war, it could spark an actual war. It certainly sounds very dangerous. Military solutions are now fully in place,locked and loaded,should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path! Trump realDonaldTrump August 11, But to a theorist, tough talk could be the smart play. The U. The potential risk was all-out nuclear war between two superpowers.

But now consider the standoff with North Korea. Kim Jong Un, on the other hand, wants to be left alone and to be safe from American threats. Obviously the U. Another difference from our game: The stakes are different for each side. Trump administration officials are cautiously optimistic the discussions could lead to a more substantive negotiation about capping — and perhaps even decreasing — the number of nuclear weapons both countries have in their stockpiles.

This matters for U. President Trump Donald Trump Three men indicted for fraud in. Instead, he is prodding China to join a trivariate arrangement. But in prefacing or linking an extension of New START to a fresh accord that includes the Chinese, the administration is increasing the possibility of ending up with neither. For one, pushing Beijing to into a three-way deal is like pushing on a locked door.

An offensive nuclear strike is not something U. To focus on a U. Nov 10, , am EST. Nov 9, , pm EST. Nov 9, , am EST.

Nov 8, , pm EST. Nov 8, , am EST. Edit Story. I write about national security, especially its business dimensions. The U.